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PARTIES’ POWER TO VARY STANDARDS
FOR REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARDS
Richard E. Speidel*
I. BACKGROUND:  THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
In every area of the law there are core questions touching the essence of
the enterprise.  In arbitration law, two such questions are (1) When is a transac-
tion “arbitration” within the scope of relevant treaties and statutes dealing with
arbitration agreements and awards?; and (2) If the parties have agreed to arbi-
trate disputes between them, to what extent can they vary by agreement the
effect of applicable arbitration treaties and legislation?1  More precisely, can
parties agree to expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards to
include review for errors of fact or law?
Unfortunately, neither of these questions is clearly answered under con-
temporary arbitration law, whether domestic or international.
Under one view of the enterprise, arbitration involves both a commitment
by the parties to submit agreed disputes to third parties for a decision on the
merits and an explicit or implicit agreement that the award shall be final and
binding between them on the merits.  Under this view, if the parties have
agreed to arbitration, they have no power to vary the effect of the rules that
determine the enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards.  These rules
(on the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate and the finality of awards) are
mandatory rather than default rules.  Thus, an agreement between the parties to
expand the scope of judicial review is not enforceable2 within the framework of
* Richard E. Speidel, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Beatrice
Kuhn Professor Emeritus, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 A distinction should be drawn between mandatory arbitration law and mandatory rules of
substantive law, such as a right created by statute.  The effect of rules in the first category
cannot be varied by agreement.  Substantive rules in the second category are related to arbi-
tration in that they may not be “capable” of arbitration or, if decided by an arbitration panel,
may be more susceptible to judicial review on the merits. See Phillip J. McConnaughay, The
Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness:  A “Second Look” at International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1999).
2 This was the result in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d
987, 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004).  The court
severed the illegal clause from the agreement, leaving the arbitration award to stand or fall
under the provisions of section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, as interpreted by the
courts.  In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh and the Tenth Circuits also adhere to
this view. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1985 v. Hoover Co.,  No. 5:05-CV-2780,
2006 WL 1876588, at *8 n.2 (N.D. Ohio July 5, 2006) (Sixth Circuit undecided).
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applicable arbitration law.3  This approach, which denies “freedom of con-
tract,” necessarily assumes that there are public interests beyond those of the
parties to the arbitration agreement that would be adversely affected.  Those
interests include the need to maintain a legal framework that ensures that the
presumed objectives of arbitration—achieving a relatively quick, informal,
inexpensive, and final decision of the dispute—are achieved.
Another view of the enterprise is less concerned about the definition of
arbitration or how the line between mandatory and default rules should be
drawn.  Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which applies in
interstate commerce, neither defines arbitration nor states which provisions are
mandatory and which are default.4  Thus, it is not clear whether the FAA
applies if the parties have committed themselves to submit a dispute to arbitra-
tors but have stated that the award is not final on the merits.5 Some courts6 and
commentators7 have, without clearly resolving the definitional problem, con-
cluded that the FAA is a collection of default rules, the effect of which can be
varied by agreement.  If the parties agreed to arbitrate and a dispute between
them has been resolved by an arbitral award, the court, within the framework of
the FAA, should enforce the agreement to expand the scope of review and
either vacate the award or remand the case to the arbitrators if there are errors
of fact or law.
Three different types of arguments are mustered to support this
conclusion.
3 See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl:  Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Func-
tional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123 (2002).  In a careful and well reasoned article, Professor
Schmitz argues both that arbitration means commitment to arbitrate and finality of the award
and that the provisions of section 10 of the FAA are mandatory rules.  Thus, an agreement to
expand the scope of judicial review cannot be enforced under the FAA but might be enforce-
able as a non-arbitration dispute procedure under the common law.
4 Section 10, stating the grounds for vacating awards, simply says that a court with jurisdic-
tion and venue “may make an order vacating the award” where one or more of the stated
grounds are found.  The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“RUAA”) does not define arbitra-
tion.  It does, however, attempt to state which rules are mandatory and which can be varied
by agreement.  Although the statutory grounds for vacating an award cannot be varied, the
RUAA took no position on whether the parties could expand those grounds by agreement.
See Christoper R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA:  Default Rules, Mandatory Rules,
and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419 (2003).
5 See, e.g., Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003).  In Dluhos, the court held that
the ICANN Dispute Resolution Procedure, called “arbitration,” was not subject to the FAA
when either party could go to court at any stage of the proceeding.  On the other hand, the
court suggested that a procedure might be arbitration if the parties were committed to send
the dispute to arbitrators for a decision and the “arbitration at issue . . . might realistically
settle the dispute.” Id. at 370 (quoting Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 349
(3d Cir. 1997) (procedure not arbitration if neither party committed to arbitrate)).
6 See P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Co., 427 F.3d 21, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2005) (Parties may
vary standard of review “only by clear contractual language.”), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1071
(2006).  The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits follow this approach. See Kristen M.
Blankley, Be More Specific!  Can Writing a Detailed Arbitration Agreement Expand Judi-
cial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act?, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 391 (2006)
(supporting clear agreements defining and limiting power of arbitrators).
7 See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 4; Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do?
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (2004).
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First, since arbitration is a “creature of contract,” the parties should be able
to craft an enforceable procedure that responds to their particular needs.  If they
have submitted a dispute to arbitration but are concerned about the quality of
the award, why not let them consent to broader judicial review?  Put differ-
ently, why deny them the protection of applicable arbitration law simply
because they have agreed to vary it?
Second, the intent of Congress when it enacted the FAA in 1925 was to
protect the agreement to arbitrate by providing strong enforcement remedies,
not to create a set of mandatory rules.  Arguments to the contrary are generated
more from the Supreme Court’s purposive and, to some, improper interpreta-
tion of the FAA rather than the legislative history of the statute.8
Third, there is no persuasive evidence that enforcing agreements
expanding the scope of review will thwart the traditional purposes of arbitra-
tion, namely to obtain a relatively quick, informal, and inexpensive award that
will settle the dispute fairly between the parties.  Whether those purposes are
being achieved under current arbitration law and practice is open to question.
Moreover, further damage is done (arguably) by the judicially created “mani-
fest disregard of law” standard, which creates incentives for losers to attack
arbitration awards even though the odds of success are virtually nil.9
In sum, these arguments support the conclusion that, at a minimum, parties
can “opt in” to an arbitration treaty or statute by agreeing in writing to arbitrate
a dispute and, once into the statute (and committed to arbitrate), can vary the
grounds for reviewing the award without losing the benefits and protections of
the statute.10
II. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
How do these two questions play out in the enforcement of international
commercial arbitration agreements and awards?11  In this arena, the dominant
treaty is the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
8 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:  REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONLIZATION 134-55 (1992); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes
in Statutory Interpretation:  The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004).
9 For strong arguments supporting the “default rule” conclusion, see EDWARD BRUNET,
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 111-23 (2006) [hereinafter Brunet ET AL., ARBITRATION
LAW IN AMERICA]. See also Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the
Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 449, 453-57 (2005) (critiquing reasons offered to deny
power to vary).
10 For example, if there was a “valid provision” to settle the dispute by arbitration, see 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2000), a party might petition for an order compelling arbitration, § 4, and an
injunction against a lawsuit pending arbitration, § 3.  Similarly, after the award the winning
party could petition the court for an order confirming the award, which order would be
granted unless the other party invoked the agreement expanding the scope of judicial review.
§ 9.
11 Professor Moses has discussed some of the complexities under the New York Conven-
tion. See Moses, supra note 7, at 456-65.  She assumes that an agreement to expand the
scope of judicial review is enforceable under section 10 of the FAA.
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Awards (the “New York Convention”),12 now ratified by 134 countries, includ-
ing the United States.  In the United States, the New York Convention
(“NYC”) is implemented by Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the
“Convention Act”) and, to the extent not in conflict with the Convention Act,
Chapter 1 of the FAA.13
The implementing legislation varies from country to country.  Thus, in
England the NYC is implemented by the English Arbitration Act of 1996.
Other countries have enacted in whole or in part the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985.14  Unfortunately, none of
these documents define arbitration, and, except for the English Arbitration
Act,15 none clearly state which arbitration rules are mandatory and which are
not.
Let us work through these problems with a simple hypothetical.
Suppose that an American seller (“S”) and a British buyer (“B”) enter into
an international contract for the sale of goods.  Against all odds, they choose
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(“CISG”) as the governing law.  They also agree to arbitrate all disputes arising
under or relating to the contract.  Under the agreement, if S commences arbitra-
tion, the place of arbitration is New York City under the AAA International
Arbitration Rules.  If B commences arbitration, the place of arbitration is
London under the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration
(“LCIA”).  Finally, after some serious discussion, they also agree that at the
option of the losing party, any arbitration award “shall be reviewed by a court
at the place of arbitration for errors of fact or law.”  In short, in a contract to
arbitrate subject to the NYC they have agreed to expand the scope of judicial
review of an international arbitral award.16
12 See United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
13 9 U.S.C. § 208.
14 See BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 191-98.  Professor
Richard E. Speidel wrote Chapter Six on International Commercial Arbitration.
15 Section 1(b) of the EAA states that the “parties should be free to agree how their disputes
are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest.”  English
Arbitration Act § 1(b) (1996).  The “mandatory” provisions, which are stated in Schedule 1,
include sections 66-68, dealing with enforcement of the award, challenging the award, and
challenging the award for serious irregularity, but not section 69 which deals with “[a]ppeal
on point of law.”  English Arbitration Act sched. 1.
The UN Model Law is less explicit but reaches the same general result:  The provisions
of the act cannot be varied by agreement unless the phrase “unless otherwise agreed” or the
word “may” appears in a particular section. See BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA, supra note 9, at 219.  It is clear that the grounds for denying recognition and
enforcement to an award are not subject to variance by agreement. See UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 36(1) (1985) (“Recognition or enforce-
ment of an arbitral award . . . may be refused only” if the grounds stated in art. 36(1)(a) &
(b) are satisfied.).
16 See BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 210-13 (discussing
when an arbitration is international).
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A. Enforcement of Foreign Awards
1. English Award Enforced in the United States
Assume first that a dispute arose and B commenced arbitration in London.
In situations like this, the arbitration is subject to the English Arbitration Act of
1996 and (let us say) the LCIA arbitration rules.17  Suppose that after a full and
fair hearing the tribunal decided that (1) S had breached the contract of sale; (2)
B had properly avoided the contract for fundamental breach; and (3) B was
entitled to consequential damages in the amount of $1,000,000.  Shortly there-
after, B filed a motion in the federal district court of the Southern District of
New York seeking recognition and enforcement of the award under the NYC.18
S, invoking the contract clause, defends on the ground that the arbitral tribunal
made a serious error of law in finding that the contract was properly avoided
for fundamental breach and serious errors of fact in calculating consequential
damages.  B responds that the contract clause expanding the scope of review
under Article V of the NYC is not enforceable.  S counters with the argument
that under Chapter 1 of the FAA at least some courts have held, and most
commentators have opined, that agreements to expand the scope of review are
enforceable and urges the court to adopt that position and thus review the
award for errors of law and fact within the framework of the NYC.
Let us assume that the Second Circuit would agree that such agreements
are enforceable under Chapter 1 of the FAA.19  Should the court adopt S’s
position when the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is
involved?  In my opinion, the court should reject S’s argument.20
The NYC does not define arbitration or clearly state whether the effect of
its provisions can be varied by agreement.  Nevertheless, it is hard to believe
that private parties have power to vary the effect of an international treaty that
is the Supreme Law of the Land and was designed to promote uniformity in the
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards in commercial transactions
and to minimize the effect of domestic arbitration law.21  In particular, Article
III provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as
binding and enforce them . . . under the conditions laid down in the following
17 The English Arbitration Act (“EAA”) applies, in general, when the “seat of the arbitration
is in England . . . .”  English Arbitration Act § 2(1).  The EAA does not explicitly distinguish
between domestic and international arbitration when the arbitration is held in England,
although language from the agreement enforcement provision of the NYC is used. See, e.g.,
§ 9(4).
18 See 9 U.S.C. § 207; United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration,
supra note 12.  It is assumed that there are no objections to jurisdiction or venue.
19 This is still an open question in the Second Circuit.
20 See BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 200-02.
21 The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of arbitration in “truly international”
agreements to achieve order and predictability and to avoid the submission of claims to
hostile or uninformed forums.  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1974);
see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985).  In Mitsubishi, the Court enforced an international agreement to arbitrate a dispute
that was not arbitrable under domestic law.  The Court stressed the “concerns of interna-
tional comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity
to the need of international commercial systems for predictability in the resolution of dis-
putes” to support the decision. Id.
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articles.”  Article V states the grounds upon which recognition and enforcement
of an award “may be refused” but “only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority . . . proof that” one of the listed grounds in Article V(1) has been
satisfied.  Although courts have some discretion in the application of these
grounds, the better reasoned cases (in the United States) have held that the
specified grounds in Article V are the exclusive grounds for denying recogni-
tion and enforcement to foreign awards.22  This means that the grounds for
vacating awards stated in section 10 of the FAA, including the judicially cre-
ated and disruptive ground of “manifest disregard of law,” are not applicable in
this setting.  Although nothing is certain, it is a safe bet that a private agreement
attempting to expand the “exclusive” grounds stated in Article V would not be
enforced by American courts.  This bet is consistent with two of the most
important reasons why private parties agree to international arbitration:  (1) to
obtain reliable enforcement of international arbitration awards; and (2) to
secure the advantages of a neutral forum.23  In sum, this is the result that should
follow when recognition and enforcement of an international arbitration award
made in England is sought in the United States.
2. United States Award Enforced in England
Assume, instead, that S commenced arbitration in New York under the
AAA Rules and obtained an award against B.  No recourse against the award
was taken by B in the United States.  S then sought recognition and enforce-
ment of the award under the NYC in London, and B invoked the agreement and
asked the Commercial Court to review the award for errors of fact or law.
The English Arbitration Act applies the same standards to international
arbitrations “seated” in London as it does to domestic arbitrations.  Foreign
arbitration awards, i.e., international arbitration awards made in another coun-
try, are treated specifically under Article V of the New York Convention.24  In
particular, section 103(1) of the English Arbitration Act provides that
“[r]ecognition or enforcement of a New York Convention award shall not be
refused except . . .” in the cases stated in section 103(2), (3), and (4)—cases
that follow those stated in Article V of the NYC.  This does not mean that
domestic arbitration law is irrelevant to the enforcement process.  For example,
section 103(3) provides that an award may be denied recognition and enforce-
ment if the court finds that the subject “matter . . . is not capable of settlement
by arbitration” under the law of the country where recognition and enforcement
is sought.  Similarly, recognition and enforcement can be denied if the award is
“contrary to [the] public policy” of the country where recognition and enforce-
ment is sought.  In these cases, domestic law is relevant but only through the
22 See, e.g., Yusuf Ahmed & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1111 (1998).
23 See BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 188-89.  Although
the parties in particular transactions may have different objectives, their agreement to expand
the scope of review under Article V in effect contracts out of the New York Convention.
24 Section 100(1) provides that a “‘New York Convention Award’ means an award made, in
pursuance of an arbitration agreement, in the territory of a state (other than the United King-
dom) which is a party to the New York Convention.”  English Arbitration Act § 100(1)
(1996).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ113.txt unknown Seq: 7 17-JAN-08 9:02
320 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:314
application of Article V of the NYC, not because of some doctrine or agree-
ment apart from the grounds stated in Article V.  Thus, if section 103, incorpo-
rating Article V of the NYC, states the exclusive grounds for denying
recognition and enforcement, it seems clear to me that an agreement expanding
the scope of judicial review would not be enforceable under section 103 of the
English Arbitration Act even though such an agreement might be enforceable
under English arbitration law.25
B. Enforcement of Non-Domestic Award in the Country Where Made
As others have noted,26 the issue is more complicated when recognition
and enforcement of a non-domestic award made in the United States or in
England is sought in the country where the award is made.
Assume that S and B arbitrated in New York City, and B obtained an
award on issues of liability and remedy.  Article II of the NYC, as implemented
by section 202 of the FAA, extends protection of the Convention to both non-
domestic arbitration agreements and awards made in the country where
enforcement is sought.27  The clearest example is our hypo where an award is
made in New York in an arbitration between S, doing business in the United
States, and B, doing business in England.  This is a non-domestic as opposed to
a foreign arbitration award.
Now suppose that S files a motion to vacate the award in favor of B in a
federal district court under section 10 of the FAA.  Or, in the alternative, sup-
pose that B files a motion for recognition and enforcement of the award under
the NYC, and S, in addition to the defenses in Article V of the NYC, asserts the
grounds to vacate under section 10.  In addition to the statutory grounds, S
claims that the award was in “manifest disregard of the law” and also asserts
that under the agreement between the parties the court should review the award
25 An agreement to expand the scope of review of a point of law in the award would be
enforceable in England if it complied with the requirements for appealing on a “point of
law” in section 69 of the EAA.  Section 69 does not establish a mandatory rule. See English
Arbitration Act sched. 1.  Rather, the parties can agree to appeal or not “to the court on a
question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings.”  § 69(1).  All of the parties
to the proceeding must agree to the appeal.  If there is disagreement, appeal may be had
“with the leave of the court.”  § 69(2)(b).  The grounds for granting leave to appeal are stated
in section 69(3).  § 69(3).
26 See Moses, supra note 7.
27 Article I(1) of the NYC first states that the Convention applies to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards “made in the territory of a State other than the State where
the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought” and then states that the Conven-
tion also applies to “arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where
their recognition and enforcement are sought.”  United Nations Conference on International
Commercial Arbitration, supra note 12; 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2000).  Section 2 of the FAA
excludes from the Convention an “agreement or arbitral award arising out of [a commercial,]
legal relationship . . . which is entirely between citizens of the United States” unless their
relationship has specified contacts with “one or more foreign states.”  9 U.S.C. § 202.  By
implication, an award between citizens or businesses with places of business in different
states is a non-domestic award and is subject to the Convention. See BRUNET ET AL., ARBI-
TRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 303-05 (discussing cases).
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for errors of fact and law.  Is section 10 and its domestic law baggage relevant
to the enforcement of non-domestic awards?28
At first glance the answer appears to be “no.”  The “manifest disregard”
defense is not listed in Article V of the Convention, and agreements expanding
the scope of judicial review are, as suggested earlier, unenforceable under the
Convention.  After a second glance, however, the answer is actually “yes.”  The
better reasoned cases in the United States have held that FAA section 10 and
the “manifest disregard” defense are available to vacate a non-domestic award
made in the United States.29  The reason is Article V(1)(e) of the Convention,
which provides that a court “may” deny recognition and enforcement if the
“award has . . . been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”  Fairly
read, it recognizes that a non-domestic award might be set aside under the
domestic arbitration law of the country in which the award was made or under
the arbitration law chosen by the parties.30  By extension, a court might con-
clude than an award set aside for errors of law by a court where the award was
made under an enforceable agreement to expand judicial review fits within
Article V(1)(e).  Put differently, if the Second Circuit enforced agreements to
expand the scope of judicial review under section 10 of the FAA, those agree-
ments would limit the enforcement of the non-domestic award.
Under this analysis, both a court in England and a federal district court in
the United States could deny B recognition and enforcement of a non-domestic
award under Article V(1)(e) of the Convention because it had been vacated
under domestic arbitration law, broadly conceived.  If S has no assets outside of
the United States, B is stymied.  Even if S has assets in other countries, an
effort by B to seek recognition and enforcement of the award there would be
subject to the defense in Article V(1)(e) that the award “has been set aside . . .
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.”31
28 These arguments make the most sense where the arbitrators or the parties have selected
an identified body of substantive law for the merits of the case.  Suppose the parties selected
New York law.  If the arbitrators, instead, applied Ohio law, the award could be vacated on
the ground that the arbitrators had “exceeded their powers.”  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).  If the
arbitrators, in applying New York law, knew that a specific rule applied to the case, and then
ignored or refused to apply it, this would be a “manifest disregard” of the law.  If, however,
the arbitrators knew of and applied the rule, but made an error in application, the award
could not be vacated under FAA section 10 unless the agreement permitting expanded judi-
cial review were enforceable.
29 Toys “R” Us is the leading case.  Yusuf Ahmed & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d
15 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1111 (1998); see also BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRA-
TION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 303-05.
30 See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 287-93 (5th Cir. 2004).  In Karaha, the court held that an award set aside under
the law of a country not chosen by the parties or under the law of a country other than where
the award was made did not fit under Article V(1)(e). Id. at 309.  The court reasoned that
courts under Article V(1)(e) had primary jurisdiction over the proceedings. Id. at 287.
Courts in other countries had secondary jurisdiction and their efforts to set aside the award
were not effective under the Convention. Id.
31 See English Arbitration Act § 103(2)(f) (1996).
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C. Discretion of Court Where Foreign Arbitration Award Has Been Set
Aside in Country Where Made
To take the next step in the labyrinth, would England or any other country
have any discretion to grant recognition of a foreign award even though it had
been set aside in the country where made?  After all, B is a citizen of Great
Britain and has been denied access to the assets of S in the United States.
From the standpoint of an English court, there is some discretion in cases
like this.  Even if the award has been vacated in the United States, Article V is
permissive:  recognition and enforcement “may be refused” even if grounds are
established under Article V(1)(e).32  Moreover, Article VII(1), in bold lan-
guage, declares that the “provisions of the present Convention shall not . . .
deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an
arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties
of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”33
Finally, to protect B, a British corporation with no recourse in the United
States, the court might be persuaded to interpret the word “law” in Article
V(1)(e) to exclude an enforceable agreement to expand the scope of review.
On the other hand, a decision to deny recognition because of Article V(1)(e)
supports the Convention in a case where an agreement authorizing a court to
review points of law in an award is permitted under section 69 of the English
Arbitration Act.34
To put the shoe on the other foot, suppose a non-domestic English award
was made in London in favor of S, an American corporation, against B, a cor-
poration doing business in England.  B, either under an enforceable agreement
to expand the right of appeal or under domestic arbitration law, succeeded in
getting the award vacated due to alleged errors of law.  S then sought recogni-
tion and enforcement in the United States in a jurisdiction that does not recog-
nize the validity of agreements expanding the power of courts to review awards
and adheres to the notion that courts have no power under the Convention or
the FAA to review awards for errors of fact or law.35  Is this a case where
recognition and enforcement should be denied under Article V(1)(e) or is this a
32 See § 103(2).
33 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 12; 9
U.S.C. § 207 (2000).  This language, from the NYC, is not repeated in sections 99-104 of the
EAA.  Rather, section 104 provides:  “Nothing in the preceding provisions of this Part
affects any right to rely upon or enforce a New York Convention award at common law or
under section 66 [dealing with ‘enforcement of the award’].”  English Arbitration Act § 104.
Commentators have puzzled about how section 66 and sections 99-104 “work together” and
noted that recognition and enforcement can be denied only on grounds set out in section
103(2) and that enforcement under section 66 provides “greater opportunity for possible
refusal.” BRUCE HARRIS ET AL., THE ARBITRATION ACT OF 1996:  A COMMENTARY
§ 104(D) (2d ed. 2000).
34 Suppose the award in the United States was not vacated and B sought recognition and
enforcement against S in England.  S, citing an agreement to permit an appeal on points of
law, seeks to suspend enforcement under section 69 of the EAA until the appeal is com-
pleted.  This, of course, is not a ground to deny recognition and enforcement under Article V
of the New York Convention, and unless the court is prepared to say that such agreements
validly expand the scope of Article V, S’s effort should be rejected.
35 For such a case, see Baxter International, Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829 (7th
Cir.), reh’g denied, 325 F.3d 954 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 963 (2003).
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case where S, under Article VII(1), should be entitled to enforcement because
of a “right” S has under “the law or treaties of the country where such award is
sought to be” enforced?
In my opinion, a signpost in the right direction is the Baker Marine case,36
where the court refused to give recognition and enforcement to an international
award made in Nigeria that had been vacated under the arbitration law of that
country.  The court conceded that the grounds for vacating an award under
Nigerian law differed from those in the United States, but noted that the parties
had chosen Nigerian arbitration law by agreement and there was no evidence
that the Nigerian court had misapplied that law.  Moreover, the court was con-
cerned that a “mechanical application” of Article VII(1) would undercut the
goal of finality in international arbitration.37
III. SOLUTIONS
In sum, the problem discussed here arises where non-domestic arbitration
awards are vacated by enforcing an agreement between the parties expanding
the scope of review to include errors of law or fact.  These agreements are, in
my opinion, not enforceable under the NYC or the Model Law but may become
relevant under Article V(1)(e) of the NYC.  What are the possible solutions to
this problem?
In my opinion, a complete solution to the disconnect between Article
V(1)(e) of the Convention and section 10 of the FAA is for Congress to enact a
provision like Article 34 of the Model Law to supplant section 10 of the FAA
as the law for the enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards in the United
States.  The grounds for a successful recourse against a non-domestic award
under Article 34 are, in essence, the same as in Article V of the NYC.  Thus, a
parity would be achieved for the recognition and enforcement of “foreign” and
non-domestic arbitration awards.  More importantly, agreements to expand the
scope of review of international awards would not be enforceable,38 and the
“manifest disregard” defense would be consigned to the trash can.
A less complete solution is for the Supreme Court to resolve the disagree-
ment among the circuits on the enforceability of agreements expanding the
scope of judicial review under section 10 of the FAA.  One wonders why this
did not occur in the Kyocera case,39 where the petition for certiorari was dis-
missed.  If the Court agreed with the result in Kyocera, it could have affirmed
the en banc judgment and resolved the question once and for all—private
agreements expanding the scope of review under section 10 of the FAA are not
enforceable.  A decision like this would be predictable, given the Court’s pur-
36 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
37 A much maligned case applying Article VII(1) is Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). See Ray Y. Chan, Note, The Enforce-
ability of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States:  A Critique of Chromalloy,
17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141 (1999).
38 I have argued elsewhere that the award enforcement articles of the Model Law, based as
they are on the New York Convention, cannot be varied by agreement. See BRUNET ET AL.,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 200-02.
39 Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000, 1002 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004).
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posive, regulatory, pro-arbitration interpretations of the FAA.  Apart from any
impingement on freedom of contract, an affirmation of the Kyocera result
would facilitate ex ante planning by commercial parties and protect finality in
international arbitration by precluding agreements to expand judicial review
from sneaking in through the back door provided by Article V(1)(e) of the
Convention.
A final part of the solution requires improved certainty about a working
definition of arbitration.  This need for certainty is reduced if agreements
expanding the scope of judicial review are not enforceable.  Arbitration (and
thus the scope of applicable treaties and statutes) can be defined as requiring
both a commitment to submit disputes to arbitrators for decision and an express
or implied intent that decisions on the merits are final.  But if such agreements
are enforceable, the finality dimension is impaired.  Rather than tossing the
entire procedure to law outside of the scope of those treaties and statutes, I
would ask whether the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to the arbitra-
tors on the merits and, if so, what are the chances finality will be achieved even
though the contract contains an agreement expanding judicial review?  In other
words, the parties should be entitled to some of the protections of the statute
consistent with the agreement to arbitrate even though the award enforcement
procedures are not available.
Here is a proposed legislative solution to part of the problem.
Section 30.  Enforcing the Arbitral Award.
(a) Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made in
conformance with applicable law, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court
for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration.  The
court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral
of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in Article V of the Convention.
(b) Sections 9-13 of Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act shall not apply to a
motion to confirm made or any defense to confirmation raised under this Act.  In
particular, it is not necessary for confirmation of the award that the parties have
agreed that a judgment shall be entered by a court on the award or have specified the
court.
Section 31.  Recourse Against the Arbitral Award.
(a) The grounds stated in Article V of the Convention for denying recognition and
enforcement to a non-domestic award shall also apply to any motion to vacate or
obtain recourse against the award, regardless of whether a motion to confirm the
award has been made.
(b) To vacate or obtain recourse against an award made in the United States or its
territories, the award must be a non-domestic award subject to the Convention and
this Act.  An application to vacate or obtain recourse against the award must be made
within three months from the date which the party making the application received
the award or if a request has been made for action under Section 29 of this Act, the
date when any correction, interpretation, or additional award were made.
(c) If a timely motion to confirm an arbitral award is made after a timely motion to
vacate or obtain recourse against the award has been made, the court shall proceed as
if the motion to confirm had been made first.  In any case where defenses permitted
under Article V are raised, the court may, where appropriate and so requested by a
party, suspend the proceedings for an appropriate period of time to give the tribunal
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an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in
the tribunal’s opinion will eliminate the grounds for setting the award aside.
In sum, this legislative solution explicitly removes Chapter 1 of the FAA
from the process of recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards under
the NYC, whether the awards are foreign or non-domestic.  It both eliminates
the uncertainty created by different standards under and interpretations of
Chapter 1 and promotes the de-localization of international arbitration law and
procedure.
